In later versions of this specification standard service names and interfaces for common services such as mail delivery and WWW CGI scripts will be specified.
userv
-using applications and system services which hide
userv
behind wrapper scripts may need to store information in the
user's filespace to preserve the correct placement of the security perimiters.
Such applications should usually do so in a directory (created by them)
~/.userv/.servdata/service, where service is
the service name or application in question.
The use of a dot-directory inside ~/.userv will hopefully avoid the user becoming confused by finding parts of a semi-privileged application's internal state in their filespace, and or discourage them from fiddling with and thus corrupting it. (Note that such applications should of course not rely for their global integrity on the integrity of the data on the user's side of the security boundary.)
Currently most Unix systems have many components which need to run as root, even though most of their activity does not strictly require it. This gives rise to a large and complex body of code which must be trusted with the security of the system.
Using userv
many of these subsystems no longer need any unusual
privilege.
cron
and at
, lpr
and the system's mail
transfer agent (sendmail
, smail
, exim
or
the like) all fall into this category.
userv
-using facilities
There is a danger that people reimplementing the facilities I mention above
using userv
will discard much of the security benefit by using a
naive implementation technique. This will become clearer with an example:
Consider the lpr
program. In current systems this needs to have
an absolutely privileged component in order to support delayed printing without
copying: when the user queues a file to be printed the filename is stored in
the print queue, rather than a copy of it, and the printer daemon accesses the
file directly when it is ready to print the job. In order that the user can
print files which are not world-readable the daemon is given root privilege so
that it can open the file in the context of the user, rather than its own.
A simple-minded approach to converting this scheme to use userv
might involve giving the printer daemon (the lp
user) the ability
to read the file by allowing them to run cat
(or a special-purpose
file-reading program) as any user. The lpr
program would use a
userv
service to store the filename in the printer daemon's
queues, and the daemon would read the file later when it felt like it.
However, this would allow the printer daemon to read any file on the system,
whether or not someone had asked for it to be printed. Since many files will
contain passwords and other security-critical information this is nearly as bad
as giving the daemon root access in the first place. Any security holes in the
print server which allow a user to execute commands as the lp
user
will give the user the ability to read any file on the system.
Instead, it is necessary to keep a record of which files the daemon has been
asked to print outside the control of the print daemon. This record
could be kept by a new root-privileged component, but this is not necessary:
the record of which files a user has asked to be printed can be kept under the
control of the user in question. The submission program lpr
will
make a record in an area under the user's control before communicating with the
print server, and the print server would be given the ability to run a special
file-reading program which would only allow files to be read which were listed
in the user's file of things they'd asked to print.
Now security holes in most of the printing system do not critically affect the security of the entire system: they only allow the attacker to read and interfere with print jobs. Bugs in the programs run by the print server to read users' files (and to remove entries from the list of files when it has done with them) will still be serious, but this program can be quite simple.
Similar considerations apply to many userv
-based versions of
facilities which currently run as root.
It is debatable whether the user-controlled state should be kept in the user's filespace (in dotfiles, say) or kept in a separate area set aside for the purpose; however, using the user's home directory (and probably creating a separate subdirectory of it as a dotfile to contain many subsystems' state) has fewer implications for the rest of the system and makes it entirely clear where the security boundaries lie.
userv
is not a replacement for really
and sudo
userv
is not intended as a general-purpose system administration
tool with which system administrators can execute privileged programs when they
need to. It is unsuitable for this purpose precisely because it enforces a
strong separation between the calling and the called program, which is
undesirable in this context.
Its facilities for restricting activities to running certain programs may at
first glance seem to provide similar functionality to sudo
[2]. However, the separation mentioned
above is a problem here too, particular for interaction - it can be hard for a
userv
service program to interact with its real caller or the user
in question.
Do not specify general purpose programs like mv
or
cat
in execute-
directives without careful thought
about their arguments, and certainly not if no-suppress-args
is
specified. If you do so it will give the caller much more privilige than you
probably intend.
It is a shame that I have to say this here, but inexperienced administrators
have made similar mistakes with programs like sudo
.
ian@davenant.greenend.org.uk